Section 1983

42 USC 1983: Deprivation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law

42 USC 1983 prohibits persons, under color of state law, from depriving individuals of civil rights. The statute states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

In enacting this statute, Congress meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by an official’s abuse of his or her position. 15 Am Jur 2d Civil Rights §16. The purpose was to provide a federal remedy where state law was inadequate or where a theoretically adequate state remedy was not available in practice. Id.

A 42 USC 1983 claim must be grounded on a constitutional violation. In other words, a plaintiff in a 42 USC 1983 case must base his or her action on some constitutional provision, like:

• The First Amendment, which prohibits the government from violating religious freedoms; speech, press, and assembly freedoms; freedom of association (such as marriage); and the right to petition (which gives rise to retaliation claims); or
• The Fourteenth Amendment, which requires due process and equal protection based on race, sex, and alienage.

Numerous cases have held that the statute’s protections encompass the panoply of rights guaranteed by the federal constitution, such as rights relating to free speech, fair trial, interstate travel, suffrage, public assistance, housing, peaceable assembly, property, freedom of the press, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and freedom of religion.

Unlike 42 USC 1981 and 42 USC 1982, there must be state action to support a 42 USC 1983 claim. State action includes acts by municipalities. Monell v Department of Soc Servs, 436 US 658 (1978).

The state and its officials acting in their official capacities, however, are immune from suits for damages under 42 USC 1983.

• But state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are “persons” within the meaning of 42 USC 1983 and may be held personally liable for damages under 42 USC 1983.

Plaintiffs may sue state officials for forward-looking (prospective) injunctive relief under 42 USC 1983.

Although a plaintiff in a 42 USC 1983 case must show that the defendant caused an injury to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the plaintiff need not show that the defendant acted with the “specific intent” to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

What is Clearly Established Law?

In Johnson v VanderKooi, No 330536, 2017 Mich App LEXIS 861 (May 23, 2017), the court of appeals held that it is not clearly established law that fingerprinting and photographing someone during the course of an otherwise valid investigatory stop constitutes an unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

• Likewise, the court found that no caselaw holds that such a procedure constitutes a governmental taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
• Because plaintiff’s evidence did not show that any alleged violation of his constitutional rights was the result of an official policy or custom of “taking prints and pictures of innocent citizens,” the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant city of Grand Rapids.

The under-color-of-state-law element of 42 USC 1983 excludes from its reach conduct that is solely private, no matter how wrongful or discriminatory.

Generally, the Supreme Court narrowly defines “state action.” However, in Brentwood Academy v Tennessee Secondary Sch Athletic Ass’n, 531 US 288 (2001), the Court held that a nominally private statewide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition was engaged in “state action” by enforcing a rule against a member school where there was “pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association.”

In Correctional Servs Corp v Malesko, 534 US 61 (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court declined to recognize an implied private right of action for damages against private entities alleged to have violated a citizen’s federal constitutional rights under color of federal law, disagreeing with Hammons v Norfolk S Corp, 156 F3d 701 (6th Cir 1998).

Police Misconduct Under Section 1983

Police misconduct cases typically center around claims of:

• Excessive force, e.g., Graham v Connor, 490 US 386 (1989);
• Deliberate indifference to an individual’s constitutional or federal rights, e.g., Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97 (1976);
• False arrest or imprisonment, e.g., Malley v Briggs, 475 US 355 (1986); or
• Malicious prosecution and/or abuse of process, e.g., Dunn v Tennessee, 697 F2d 121 (6th Cir 1982), cert denied, 460 US 1086 (1983).

Where the misconduct causes the death of an individual, persons with standing to sue under 42 USC 1983 are generally determined by reference to state wrongful-death statutes. Robertson v Wigmann, 436 US 584 (1978). However, where state law would defeat the purposes underlying 42 USC 1983 (e.g., by allowing the misconduct to go unpunished), standing is determined according to federal law. See, e.g., Jaco v Bloechle, 739 F2d 239 (6th Cir 1984).

Equal Protection and Due Process Claims Under Section 1983

42 USC 1983 is often used by public employees seeking to remedy discrimination against minorities and women. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies, but is not limited to, protected categories such as race, national origin, religion, age, and sex. It may be enforced through 42 USC 1983 to challenge a wide variety of employment actions, including sexual harassment, equal pay, retaliation, and failure to promote.

The Due Process Clause is more difficult to invoke in employment cases because it is necessary to demonstrate that the employee had a property interest in his or her job, and if the job is at-will, there is no property interest.

• In Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 565 NW2d 401 (1997), the court affirmed the dismissal of a public employee’s 42 USC 1983 claim for a violation of due process, based on her termination of employment.
  • The court first noted that 42 USC 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a remedy for violations of rights guaranteed by the federal constitution and federal statutes.” 222 Mich App at 720.
  • The court then concluded that a public employee, such as plaintiff, does not have a property right to continued employment when the position is held at will. Id. at 721.
  • However, a liberty interest can also form the basis of a due process violation. Ratliff v Milwaukee, 795 F2d 612 (7th Cir 1986).

Free Speech Violations Under Section 1983

The question of whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected entails striking “a balance between the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Connick v Meyers, 461 US 138, 142 (1983); Pickering v Board of Educ, 391 US 563, 568 (1968).

In Board of County Comm’rs v Umbehr, 518 US 668 (1996), the Supreme Court held that an independent contractor has a cause of action under 42 USC 1983 when his or her at-will contract is terminated or prevented from automatic renewal in retaliation for the contractor’s exercise of free speech. See also Lucas v Monroe County, 203 F3d 964 (6th Cir 2000).

• In Lucas, plaintiff tow truck operators properly stated a claim under 42 USC 1983 where the sheriff’s department removed plaintiffs from its regular towing services rotation, thereby depriving plaintiffs of business, after plaintiffs publicly criticized the department.
• The court rejected defendant county’s argument that plaintiffs’ complaint did not involve a matter of “public concern,” stating that “the subject of favoritism and unfairness in the disbursement of government benefits … [is] a classic issue of community concern.” Id. at 974.

Prisoners’ Rights Violations Under Section 1983

Prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, including deliberate indifference to medical needs. Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97 (1976).

A pretrial detainee’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are protected to the same extent as the rights of convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. Hickey v Zezulka, 439 Mich 408, 487 NW2d 106, opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 440 Mich 1203 (1992) (plaintiff could not establish constitutional violation in support of his 42 USC 1983 claim absent showing of deliberate indifference).

In Blackmore v Kalamazoo County, 390 F3d 890 (6th Cir 2004), plaintiff claimed that defendant officers violated his civil rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to provide prompt medical treatment for his appendicitis for over two days while he was detained in the county jail.

• The Sixth Circuit clarified that where a plaintiff’s claims arise from an injury or illness so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention, the plaintiff need not present verifying medical evidence to show that even after receiving the delayed necessary treatment, his medical condition worsened or deteriorated.
• Instead, it is sufficient to show that he actually experienced the need for medical treatment and that the need was not addressed within a reasonable time.
• Because plaintiff presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that his obvious need for medical care was “sufficiently serious” and that the officers had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” summary judgment was reversed. Id. at 900; see also Johnson v Karnes, 398 F3d 868 (6th Cir 2005) (summary judgment reversed where plaintiff submitted medical request forms stating that tendons in his hand were completely severed and doctor failed to schedule prompt surgery).

Absolute Immunity Under Section 1983

Judges are entitled to absolute immunity when acting in their judicial capacities. Cooper v Parrish, 203 F3d 937 (6th Cir), cert denied, 531 US 877 (2000). However, there are two situations where judicial officers are not entitled to absolute immunity.

• First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.
• Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction.
  • For example, when a judge takes adverse employment action, he or she is acting in an administrative rather than judicial capacity, and absolute immunity does not apply.

Similarly, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity when functioning as a prosecutor “with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”

• However, a prosecutor engaging in pretrial functions “‘normally performed by a detective or police officer’ such as ‘searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested’ is entitled only at most to qualified immunity.” Cooper, 203 F3d at 947.

The doctrine of absolute immunity has also been extended to investigators and law enforcement officers where such persons are “‘performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.’”

Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983

An individual public official may be shielded from 42 USC 1983 liability based on the doctrine of qualified immunity if he or she

• “had an objectively reasonable good faith belief that his [or her] actions were lawful.” Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635 (1987);

The courts have generally followed a two-prong test for determining whether public officials are entitled to qualified immunity:

1. Whether plaintiffs have alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.
2. Whether the right is so ‘clearly established' that ‘a reasonable official’ would understand that what he is doing violates that right.

It should be noted, however, that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not extend to municipalities or other government employers where liability is based on allegations of an “official policy” that caused or contributed to the constitutional violation. Owen v City of Independence, 445 US 622, 633 (1980) (liability may be imposed against city even where individual officer enjoys qualified immunity).

Most common 'clearly established' law:

• Fourth Amendment
  • Stop and Frisk
• False Arrest
• False Imprisonment