Statute of Limitations for Civil Rights

Michigan State Law Claims

Under the ELCRA and the PDCRA, plaintiffs must file causes of action within three years from the date of the alleged discriminatory act. MCL 600.5805(10); see also Slayton v Michigan Host, Inc, 144 Mich App 535, 376 NW2d 664 (1985). In a discriminatory discharge case, the cause of action accrues on the date the plaintiff is actually discharged. Thus, the statute begins to run on the last date the plaintiff actually worked, rather than an “effective date of separation” contained in the employer’s records. Parker v Cadillac Gage Textron, 214 Mich App 288, 542 NW2d 365 (1995).

In Collins v Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628, 664 NW2d 713 (2003), plaintiff employee was suspended pending an investigation and was terminated several weeks later. The supreme court held that plaintiff’s claim for discriminatory discharge did not arise until she had actually been discharged. The situation was different in Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich 108, 693 NW2d 166 (2005), a nondischarge case. There, plaintiff took a medical leave and subsequently resigned, allegedly due to sexual harassment and retaliation. The supreme court found that because plaintiff alleged no discriminatory conduct occurring after the day she commenced her leave, the period of limitation expired three years from that date, not from the later date of her resignation.

Magee was followed in Joliet v Pitoniak, 475 Mich 30, 715 NW2d 60 (2006), where the supreme court held that a claim of constructive discharge occurring after the alleged discriminatory acts did not extend the period of limitation for discriminatory acts committed before the discharge. The Joliet court overruled Jacobson v Parda Fed Credit Union, 457 Mich 318, 577 NW2d 881 (1998), which held that allegations of constructive discharge could operate to extend the applicable period of limitation for discriminatory acts falling outside the period of limitation.

In Womack-Scott v Department of Corr, 246 Mich App 70, 630 NW2d 650 (2001), the court held that the limitation period for a claim of discriminatory discharge accrues on the date of the discharge, not on the date that an administrative agency reinstates an employee after an administrative appeal.

Before 2005, a contractual provision shortening the period of limitation was enforceable provided the limitation was “reasonable.” See Herweyer v Clark Highway Servs, 455 Mich 14, 20, 564 NW2d 857 (1997); Timko v Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc, 244 Mich App 234, 625 NW2d 101 (2001). However, in Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 470, 703 NW2d 23 (2005), the Michigan Supreme Court overruled the reasonableness requirement and held that an unambiguous contractual provision providing for a shortened period of limitation is to be enforced as written unless the provision would violate law or public policy. In Clark v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 268 Mich App 138, 706 NW2d 471 (2005), the court followed Rory and held that the six-month limitation period set forth in plaintiff’s employment contract was enforceable because it was not ambiguous, not contrary to law or public policy, and not otherwise unenforceable under recognized traditional contract defenses.

West v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co, 272 Mich App 58, 68, 723 NW2d 589 (2006), a case addressing a one-year contractual limitation period for underinsured motorist benefits claims, the court of appeals held that because Rory was “a complete break from solid, longstanding law in this state,” it is to be applied prospectively only.

In Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 664 NW2d 705 (2003), the Michigan Supreme Court held that merely filing a complaint under MCL 600.5805 was insufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The court held that in addition to filing the complaint, the plaintiff was required to serve the summons and complaint in such a way as to “stop the clock” under MCL 600.5856.

In response to Gladych, the Michigan Legislature amended MCL 600.5856 effective April 22, 2004, to provide that the statute of limitations is tolled at the time a complaint is filed if the summons and complaint are served on the defendant within the time set forth in the supreme court rules (currently 91 days). 2004 PA 87. The act also deleted a provision that tolled the statute of limitations at the time the complaint was filed and a copy of the summons and complaint in good faith were placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service. The amendment applies to civil actions filed on or after April 22, 2004. The amendment does not apply to a cause of action if the statute of limitations or repose expired before April 22, 2004.

Federal Claims

For the most part, federal civil right statutes borrow state statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Madison v Wood, 410 F2d 564 (6th Cir 1969) (claims under 42 USC 1983 governed by Michigan three-year statute); An-Ti Chai v Michigan Tech Univ, 493 F Supp 1137 (WD Mich 1980) (claims under 42 USC 1981 and 1983 governed by three-year state statute). However, there may be issues regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims. It should also be noted that at least one circuit has applied the doctrine of equitable tolling where the harassment was so severe that it destroyed the claimant’s ability to function. Stoll v Runyan, 165 F3d 1238 (9th Cir 1999).

Continuing Violations

Before 2005, Michigan law allowed a plaintiff to extend the applicable limitation period if the alleged discrimination were part of a “continuing violation,” i.e., at least some discriminatory acts occurred within the statutory period and the timely acts were so closely connected to previous time-barred claims that continuing discrimination was apparent. Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 553, 398 NW2d 368 (1986); accord Meek v Michigan Bell Tel Co, 193 Mich App 340, 483 NW2d 407 (1991) (applying continuing violation exception where at least one closely connected act occurred within limitation period).

However, in Garg v Macomb County Cmty Mental Health Servs, 472 Mich 263, 290, 696 NW2d 646, amended, 473 Mich 1205, ___ NW2d ___ (2005), the Michigan Supreme Court overruled Sumner and held that the continuing violations doctrine “has no continued place in the jurisprudence of this state.” The court found that the doctrine was simply inconsistent with the language of the statute of limitations:

[MCL 600.5805] requires a plaintiff to commence an action within three years of each adverse employment act by a defendant. Section 5805 does not say that a claim outside this three-year period can be revived if it is somehow “sufficiently related” to injuries occurring within the limitations period. Rather, the statute simply states that a plaintiff “shall not” bring a claim for injuries outside the limitations period. Nothing in these provisions permits a plaintiff to recover for injuries outside the limitations period when they are susceptible to being characterized as “continuing violations.” To allow recovery for such claims is simply to extend the limitations period beyond that which was expressly established by the Legislature.

Id. at 281–282. In a footnote, the court also held that acts falling outside the period of limitation are not admissible as background evidence in support of a timely claim. Id. at 285 n14. However, on a motion for rehearing, the court amended the opinion to strike footnote 14. Thus, plaintiffs may introduce prior acts of discrimination as background evidence, even if they did not occur within the limitation period.

The doctrine of continuing violation continues to apply in federal court, although the Garg court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected the continuing violations doctrine for Title VII claims with regard to discrete acts as contrary to the statute of limitations. AMTRAK v Morgan, 536 US 101 (2002).

In Jackson v Quanex, 191 F3d 647, 668 (6th Cir 1999), the Sixth Circuit held that application of the continuing violation doctrine was warranted where plaintiff alleged a long-standing and demonstrable policy of tolerating a racially hostile work environment in which racial graffiti and slurs and disparate treatment of African-American workers took place regularly, with little or no response by management. The doctrine is of particular relevance where a plaintiff “alleges that the hostile racial environment that damaged him psychologically developed over the years out of a series of incidents.” Id. (citing Bell v Chesapeake & Ohio Ry Co, 929 F2d 220 (6th Cir 1991), and Sumner). But see Hollowell v Michigan Consol Gas Co, 50 F Supp 2d 695, 703 (ED Mich 1999), aff’d, No 99-1754, 2001 US App LEXIS 19448 (6th Cir Aug 24, 2001) (unpublished) (no continuing violation where plaintiff’s allegations of race discrimination and retaliation involved different supervisors taking variety of different allegedly discriminatory actions over period of years, which were not sufficiently related so as to constitute pattern).